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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Defense (DoD) relies on contracts to procure almost all of the 
goods and services it uses. Because the DoD does not have its own factories, external 
suppliers must manufacture everything needed to fight wars. Every agreement made 
between an external supplier and the DoD is captured on a contract. The history of 
government contracting dates back to the earliest war fighting efforts. The American 
Civil War was an early example of large material procurement by U.S. government 
contracting representatives. Generals of both the Union and Confederate armies directly 
conducted much of the procurement. Few stated contracting rules were used at that time, 
and the guidance driving procurement was in the interest of getting the best equipment 
and getting it fast. Larry Sawers is a professor of economics at the American University 
College of Arts and Sciences. Sawers (2003) observed, 
Through haste, carelessness, or criminal collusion, the state and federal 
officers accepted almost every offer and paid almost any price for the 
commodities, regardless of character, quality, or quantity. … In the 
purchase of horses and mules … the most unblushing frauds were 
perpetrated. (p. 2) 
It is a safe assumption that the majority of military leaders have wished at some 
point in their careers to make a phone call and get needed materials from any company 
determined fit; some officers even act on this impulse. What was once a common practice 
by generals in the Civil War now has accompanying legal baggage and a name: it’s called 
an unauthorized commitment. Throwing aside a general desire for an economy of public 
resources, legal terminology, and implications of criminal charges, officers entrusted with 
warfighting should be given authority to procure whatever they need to accomplish their 
missions. Entrusting warfighters with unlimited procurement authority is often seen as 
the implied authority of being in command. This logic is drawn from a view that war 
must be won at any cost and that the fighters of the war should be exhausting all available 
resources in the effort to win. 
Success in modern war is being judged increasingly by its cost in dollars (Depaul, 
2011). Additionally, the complexity of requirements for fighting modern war has given 
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rise to the need for contract specialists. Schwartz and Swain (2011) explained how the 
increasing complexity of war, together with cuts in logistics and support personnel, have 
made it impossible for the DoD to fight wars without contractors, saying, 
Advances in warfare and technology have expanded the functions and 
responsibilities of contractors in military operations. After the Cold War, 
reliance on contractors further increased when DoD cut logistic and 
support personnel. As a result of these cuts, DoD lost in house capability 
and was forced to rely even further on contractor support. (Schwartz & 
Swain, 2011, p. 5) 
A. ALLOCATING RESOURCES FOR MODERN WARFARE 
Specific political aims are now connected with every conflict fought. The amount 
of effort the United States uses to fight a war must be proportionate to the objectives 
endorsed by the president and approved by Congress. In the case of the 9/11 attacks, a 
goal of the United States was to remove Osama bin Laden and his network of terrorists. 
The most efficient effort, if measured by cost, would have been the price of bullets 
required to dispatch Osama bin Laden and his subordinate leadership. This cost would 
have made the goal well worth the effort. Unfortunately for taxpayers, the war effort took 
on a life of its own. If we measure the war effort in terms of dollars spent for both wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the effort was much greater than originally anticipated (Depaul, 
2011). By fiscal measures, the cost of the War on Terror effort has exceeded the war 
goals.  
Contracts for fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are expensive. Compounding 
this expense is the emphasis on an all-volunteer force. The U.S. relied on drafted 
personnel to augment its career military for WWI, WWII, Korea, and Vietnam (North, 
2003). In 1973 Congress refused to extend the draft law and the authority to draft expired 
(North, 2003). As a result, the DoD must use more of its personnel in combat roles and 
outsource the support.  
Unintended consequences can come with outsourcing support. Limited oversight 
has been provided in the execution of contracted work in support of contracts for the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan (Gansler, 2007). Contract specialists, too few in numbers, may 
not have time to look over the shoulder of a contracted agency.  
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Limited contractor oversight may not result in big problems when contracting to a 
company in the U.S. with a solid responsibility determination and success easily 
measured by a delivered product. However, when contracting outside of the U.S., 
unintended outcomes can arise from contracting support and from not closely monitoring 
the methods of execution. In a Congressional research report dated May 13, 2011, 
Schwartz and Swain (2011) stated “there have been allegations that money from U.S. 
funded contracts has gone to local warlords and the Taliban” (p. 22). Contract 
management becomes especially critical in the procurement of services and as the 
complexity of the contract increases. 
B. THERE’S MORE TO A CONTRACT THAN THE AWARD 
Afghanistan is a land-locked country. To fight wars in a large, land-locked 
country, supplies must be convoyed over thousands of miles. Much of this terrain extends 
through large desert regions that are difficult to police due to size. When battles are 
fought or bases established in the interior of Afghanistan, supporting units are often 
required in equal ratios to those of combat troops (Schwartz & Swain, 2011). With finite 
numbers of personnel available, the most logical way to solve the support problem, short 
of instituting a draft, is to outsource the shipment of material, that is, to pay private 
contractors a lot of money to transport the material and assume all the risks of 
transportation. The benefit is that the military forces can focus on the fighting. The 
contractors can worry about shipping the material and deal with the risks of highwaymen 
and regional warlords.  
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) High Risk Series report highlighted 
several high risk areas of DoD contracting. One of the areas sighted was a potential over-
reliance on contractors in situations that would have been better managed by DoD 
personnel (GAO, 2011). The report stated that “DoD’s reliance on contractors is not yet 
fully guided by a systematic determination of which functions and activities should be 
contracted out or by an assessment of the risks that reliance on contractors may pose” 
(GAO, 2011, p. 125). 
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The unintended outcome that came with outsourcing the transportation of material 
in Afghanistan is that large contracts were given to several fledgling trucking companies. 
Many of these companies are merely a “front” for the various highwaymen who would 
otherwise be attacking U.S. convoys (Tierney, 2010). So, instead of fighting the attacks, 
the U.S. had paid off, directly or indirectly, the attackers with contract dollars. The result 
is that warlords are now coming to U.S. government representatives in Afghanistan as 
trucking company owners rather than bandits (Schwartz & Swain, 2011). 
Worsening the situation is that many of the strongmen taking the contract dollars 
to allow passage of supplies also support U.S. enemies in Afghanistan (Tierney, 2010). 
The warlords are turning the U.S. dollars they get from material transportation contracts 
into war equipment that they can use to fight U.S. soldiers and perpetuate the war. As 
Tierney (2010) stated, the result is that the U.S. is effectively funding its own enemy by 
“injecting a good portion of a $2.16 billion contract into a corruptive environment” (p. 3). 
It is a cycle that continues in Afghanistan according to the Gansler (2007) report. Gansler 
(2007) cites the cause of contracting missteps in Afghanistan as being directly related to 
insufficient post-award management and oversight of deliverables. The implication is that 
there must be an appropriate number of contract specialists for the administration of a 
given contracting workload.  
Manpower Models for Operational Contracting have existed in DoD contracting 
previous to the oversight issues addressed by the Gansler (2007) report. However, the 
output of these models is not always used by decision makers. The Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA) staffed its forward contracting billets in Iraq to a level 
that approximately equaled 10% of the manning required based on its own acquisition 
manning model (D. Walsh, personal communication, February 8, 2012). The model 
DCMA was using at the time took into account just the elemental functions of a contract 
to determine proper workload assignment: number of contracts, type of contracts, and 
dollar value.  
The DCMA Northern Iraq included 7 Administrative Contracting Officers 
(ACOs) and 5 Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) to administer over 11 billion 
dollars in task orders against multiple contracts in direct support of over 6 major 
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customers including: Combined Joint Task Force-7 (the coalition force headquarters and 
over 150,000 service members deployed at 50-plus locations across all of northern Iraq); 
the Iraqi Survey Group (a Defense Intelligence Agency activity operating on multiple 
locations across Iraq searching for weapons of mass destruction); the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA—military and civilian government personnel deployed to 
over 18 locations across Iraq); as well as multiple smaller contracts providing 
interpreters, television services, linguists, and protective services to all of the customers 
above and several more (D. Walsh, personal communication, February 8, 2012). 
Additionally, several of the assigned DCMA personnel lacked a strong contracting 
background that is normally required to independently serve as contracting officers (e.g. 
one was a Navy ensign with no previous contracting experience).  
A lack of adequate DCMA personnel necessitated picking and choosing which 
contracts would get attention. Life support services (i.e. food, water, base housing, 
electricity, bathing and toilets, etc.) for the soldiers living in containerized housing units 
got priority. Verifying services, such as having an Iraqi interpreter present in the palaces, 
fell by the wayside. There wasn’t time for the limited contracting staff to properly 
administer a basket of service contracts valued at over 11 billion (D. Walsh, personal 
communication, February 8, 2012). Because there was no contracting workload standard 
being enforced, checks and balances were insufficient in preventing an overload of 
contracting work. 
Problems in the DoD contracting program have, in fact, been acknowledged by 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and by Congress. The Acquisition Advisory 
Panel was authorized by section 1423 of the Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003 
(AAP, 2007, p. ix). They were tasked with reviewing laws, regulation, and government-
wide acquisition policies. The product of the panel was a formal report titled Report of 
the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the 




Based on our experience, we recognize a significant mismatch between 
the demands placed on the acquisition workforce and the personnel and 
skills available within that workforce to meet those demands. 
Accordingly, we believe that there was a serious risk that problems 
stemming from the shortcomings of the acquisition workforce would be 
misunderstood as problems with the procurement system. (AAP, 2007, p. 
327). 
The Acquisition Advisory Panel makes several recommendations, focusing on the 
problem of how to capture the person-hours required to handle the various types of 
contracts used by DoD: 
Finding 3: Even though there are now available a variety of simplified 
acquisition techniques, the complexity of the federal acquisition system as 
a whole has markedly increased since the 1980s. …  
Finding 5: The federal government does not have the capacity in its 
current acquisition workforce necessary to meet the demands that have 
been placed on it. Because of the absence of human capital planning to 
date, the Panel cannot definitively conclude whether this is the result of a 
numbers problem, but has received testimony raising serious concerns 
about the number, skill sets, deployment, and role in the acquisition 
process of the acquisition workforce. (AAP, 2007, p. 335) 
A workload standard could be used to ensure the proper amount of contract 
specialists are employed if the number of person-hours required to complete all six 
processes of a contract could be estimated. The Afghanistan trucking company is an 
extreme example of the unintended consequences that can arise when the job of 
contracting is thought to be complete once a contract has been awarded. According to 
Gansler (2007) the problem with contract workload management is as follows:  
No single person can cover all the various contracting processes nor 
provide the necessary work products, which include a defined 
requirement, statement of need, funding certification, a contract, contract 
modifications, post-award management, oversight of 
performance/deliverables, and acceptable documentation. Too often, both 
in peacetime and during expeditionary operations, the focus of the 
contracting process is on contract award, with post-award management 
being neglected. (p. 40) 
Problems such as trucking-company profiteering in Afghanistan are often 
mistaken for problems in the procurement system (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007, p. 
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327) when contract specialists are insufficient in number to provide oversight over a 
contracting workload. The reaction of Congress to these unintended consequences is 
often to institute new rules, which add even greater complexity to contracting. Managing 
this complexity requires person-hours. Thus, the go-to solution for the problem with DoD 
contracts often results in adding to the existing problem. The real solution to fixing DoD 
contracting is to identify the correct number of contracting professionals required to 
properly manage the workload.  
Timothy Reed (2011) stated in his report titled Army Contracting Command 
Workforce Model Analysis that the Navy is not pursuing a Service-wide standard for its 
contracting workforce requirements. Interestingly, Navy contracting accounts for 25% of 
DoD contracts by dollar value (Ellman, Livergood, Morrow, & Sanders, 2011). Figure 1 
illustrates the % of DoD contract spending by service between 1990 and 2010.  
 
Figure 1.   Share of DoD Contract Spending by Component, 1990–2010 ( From: 
Ellman, Livergood, Morrow, & Sanders, 2011, p. 17) 
In an environment of constrained financial and workforce resources, we 
hypothesize that the Navy must be doing some sort of workforce management in order to 
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be shouldering 25% of total Service component contracts. In this report, we seek to 
discover if a contracting workforce model is being used by the Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA) and the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) through 
personal interviews and a review of local instructions. We review the contracting 
professional requirement models used by the Army, Air Force, and civilian industries by 
conducting a literature review. We then identify the contracting workload estimation 
tools used by NAVSEA and NAVSUP, especially those used in making manpower 
decisions. We offer strengths and weaknesses of the tools and make recommendations to 
improve those methods based on the successful attributes of the Army, Air Force, and 
civilian industry workload models. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. QUANTIFYING THE CONTRACTING WORKLOAD 
In this section, we seek to answer the question of why some contracts require 
more time to produce and manage than others. We review articles, reports, and books 
pertaining to quantifying the contracting officer’s workload. We show in our descriptions 
the business that takes up the contracting officer’s time. 
From this point forward, the term contracting officer will be abbreviated as KO. 
CO is a widely used acronym for commanding officer. KO has become the accepted 
abbreviation for contracting officers in the DoD to avoid confusing references to the 
commanding officer.  
1. Contract Processes 
The activities that consume the time of a KO both before contract award and after 
award can be best identified by six key process areas: procurement planning, solicitation 
planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and contract closeout 
(Garrett, 2007). The process areas represent baskets of work that must be performed to a 
satisfactory level for the contract to be considered properly executed.  
Gansler (2007) states that post award actions are often neglected in an 
overburdened contracting workforce. Contract administration and contract closeout are 
contract process areas that occur post award. The post award processes will be the focus 
of our background review due to the likelihood that they represent the work neglected in 
an overburdened contracting workforce. 
The fifth process area is called contract administration. Contract administration 
occupies a significant portion of the KO’s duties but is often neglected in workload 
estimations because it occurs after the contract award. Getting to award is just part of the 
contract process and can be smaller than the post-award work requirements. The contract 
administration portion of the contracting process changes based on the type of contract 
and contract complexity. For example, Cost type and indefinite delivery, indefinite 
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quantity (IDIQ) contracts require inherently require more post-award contract 
administration than fixed-price contracts. A fixed price contract will require more time in 
the pre-award phases of the contract processes.  
The KO spends more time identifying the requirement for fixed-price contracts 
than cost-reimbursement type contracts. Because costs are not easily adjusted once the 
contract is awarded, misidentification of the requirement in a fixed-price contract 
becomes very problematic. If the statement of work in a requirement for compact trucks 
to be used by a DoD public works facility does not specify the color of the truck, then it 
is assumed that all colors are acceptable. After the contract has been awarded, trucks with 
purple paint may arrive. Purple is typically not acceptable for utility trucks in a 
government motor pool. Because it was not specified as a requirement in the contract, the 
DoD now must re-solicit the contract for trucks with the correct color of paint or award 
another contract for the delivered trucks to be repainted. The enemy of fixed-price 
contracts and identifying requirements in general is taking for granted that an item will 
possess certain characteristics.  
A cost-reimbursement contract is used for complex contracts. The purpose of this 
type of contract is to shift some of the contract risk from the contractor to the 
government. The government agrees to pay for all the allowable costs incurred by the 
contractor in addition to paying a predetermined fee. Incentives may be added to motivate 
the contractor to achieve cost, schedule, and/or performance goals.  
The KO workload of administering a cost-reimbursement contract is likely to 
increase the fifth contract process area. Specifically, performance reporting and managing 
the change control system will be intensive undertakings for complex products that are 
developed using cost-reimbursement type contracts. 
IDIQ contracts are a relatively new addition to the DoD contracting tool box. First 
used in the early 1990s, they have become very popular. The government uses IDIQ 
contracts when the contracting officer cannot determine “above a specified minimum, the 
precise quantities of supplies or services that the government will require during the 
contract period” (Government Services Administration [GSA], 2011, p. 1). They 
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essentially take the work of a single contracting office and multiply it. The trade-off from 
using IDIQ contracts is a potential for lack of oversight. The lack of centralized oversight 
inherent in these contracts makes them a ripe target for abuse. Congressional scrutiny has 
increased over the use of these contract types in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ashton Carter, 
former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 
expressed his concern regarding the use of IDIQ contracts in his Better Buying Power 
Initiative Three. The specific concern is that, because the award is multiplied for several 
requirements using one contracted agency, a small monopoly occurs for the company 
who gets the initial award (Carter, 2011).  
All contracts require some oversight to ensure that material is being delivered on 
time and as specified in the contract. Often, a contracting professional is needed to 
interpret the product delivery against the statement of work detailed in the contract to 
ensure that the contract conditions have been met. Thus, it is easy to multiply contract 
awards by issuing an IDIQ contract, but it is nearly impossible to multiply responsible 
contract administration. Because an IDIQ contract results in multiple deliveries under a 
single award, this type of contract will exponentially increase a contracting officer’s 
workload in the fifth and sixth areas of the contract processes: contract administration 
and contract closeout. Regardless of the contract type used to make an award, a 
significant administrative requirement comes with ensuring that contracts are properly 
executed.  
Garrett (2007) defines contract administration as “the process of ensuring that 
each party’s performance meets contractual requirements” (p. 162). Garrett states that a 
contract is “a mutually binding legal relationship obligating the seller to furnish the 
supplies or services and the buyer to pay for them” (FAR, 2005, 2.101). The assumption 
that the relationship between the KO and contractor has ended once the agreement is in 
place ignores the real-world difficulties of production and delivery. The Afghanistan 
trucking company is an example of an IDIQ contract that was woefully deficient in 
proper contract administration. The compact truck is an example of a fixed-price type 
contract that requires minimal administration due to the simple nature of the product and 
delivery method: an inspection upon delivery and payment for the unit price times the 
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quantity received. More complex developmental contracts require many more 
administrative functions be performed by the KO. Specific examples include monitoring 
the work performed, reviewing invoices, certification of the accounting system being 
used, inspection of deliverables, and conducting performance tests. 
In total, there are 71 contract administration functions listed in the FAR (2011), 
42.301, which are intended to capture the most important post-award actions. These 
contract administration functions are in place to ensure that the contract buyer 
(government) receives the correct goods or services from the seller (contractor) and that 
the contractor receives payment once the contract terms are met. Table 1 includes 
descriptions of duties that a KO typically performs as part of contract administration. 
Table 1. Contract Administration Actions  (After: Garrett, 2007, pp. 167–169) 
Contract Administration Actions Summarized Description 
Pre-performance conference The buyer and seller meet to discuss their joint 
administration of the contract. 
Performance measuring and 
reporting 
Project manager, contract manager, and 
responsible business managers must observe 
performance, collect information, and measure 
actual contract achievement. 
Payment system Every contract must establish a clear invoicing 
and payment system or process. The buyer and 
seller must agree to whom invoices should be sent 
and what information is required. 
Change control system Changes are usually inevitable in contracts for 
complex undertakings. No one has perfect 
foresight; requirements and circumstances change 
in unexpected ways, and contract terms and 
conditions must often be changed as a result. 
Dispute management system Disputes must be resolved as quickly as possible. 
If a dispute goes unresolved for too long, one or 
both of the parties may threaten, or even initiate, 
litigation. Litigation is time-consuming, costly, 





The contracting workforce requires people to manage contract administration. 
Because contract workload is primarily managerial and knowledge based (Acquisition 
and Sustainment Unit [ASU], 2011), the right people are needed to determine contract 
type, ensure requirements are specified, and provide administration throughout the 
contract execution.  
The sixth process area is called contract closeout. It is at this point that the work is 
complete and the obligation tie that binds the government and contractor is at its end. 
Contracts end in one of three ways: successful performance, mutual agreement, or breach 
of contract (Garrett, 2007, p. 185). According to the FAR (2011), a contract is considered 
physically complete when 
(1) 
 (i) The contractor has completed the required deliveries and the 
Government has inspected and accepted the supplies;  
 (ii) The contractor has performed all services and the Government has 
accepted these services; and  
 (iii) All option provisions, if any, have expired; or  
 




Successful performance is the desired state of contract termination because it 
means the goods or services were delivered or performed to a satisfactory level. The KO 
prepares a closeout report, a certificate of completion or conformance and seller’s release 
of claim (Garrett, 2007). 
2. Contract Size and its Effect on Workload 
Simplified acquisition procedures (SAP) were established to streamline the 
purchasing process of commercial items for the government. Because the price of 
commercial items are assumed to be fair and reasonable due to the pressure of existing 
market forces, aspects of competition and price analysis are eliminated for those contracts 
that fall under the SAP dollar threshold.  
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The drastic reduction in KO workload through the use of SAP is unmatched by any 
federal authorization that came before it. The specific purpose of SAP is stated in the 
FAR 13.002. The following is an excerpt citing the specific goals of SAP:  
(a) Reduce administrative costs 
(b) Improve opportunities for small, small disadvantaged, women-owned, 
veteran-owned, HUB Zone, and service-disabled veteran-owned small 
business concerns to obtain a fair proportion of Government contracts 
(c) Promote efficiency and economy in contracting; and 
(d) Avoid unnecessary burdens for agencies and contractors. (FAR 
13.002) 
More simply stated, SAP allows government contracting officials to avoid much of the 
workload required when purchasing commercial goods and services under $150,000 in 
total cost.  
An example of a KO workload factor that is eliminated under SAP is cost 
analysis. For many contract actions above the SAP threshold, KOs are required to 
conduct cost analysis that requires the contractors to submit volumes of certified cost and 
pricing data to support every element of cost. The KO must analyze this data to determine 
that the contract price being quoted by industry is fair and reasonable. Under SAP, the 
pricing is generally determined to be fair and reasonable by receiving competitive quotes 
or offers.  Here the commercial market pressures determine pricing. 
SAP not only reduces the KO’s workload, but also decreases the time and 
resources a contractor must dedicate toward ensuring that its product meets specific 
government standards. The GAO specifically states that under these procedures, “agency 
officials may select contractors using expedited evaluation and selection procedures and 
are permitted to keep documentation to a minimum” (GAO, 2001). 
Current SAP implementation authority is given by the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA; 1994). In 1994, with the passing of the FASA, the new 
adjustments to the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT) vastly changed the way the 
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government purchases its commercial items. In effect, FASA would raise the threshold 
for the government’s use of simplified acquisition procedures from $25,000 to $100,000.  
In 1994 this change was substantial; approximately 90% of the annual federal 
procurement transactions in 1994 were below the $100,000 ceiling. The effects of the 
FASA raising the simplified acquisition threshold to $100,000 vastly streamlined how the 
government would procure most of its goods and services (Cohen, Seglias, Pallas, 
Greenhal, & Furman PC, 2012). Since 1994, the rules and philosophy behind SAP have 
not changed. However, the SAP threshold has been increased to $150,000 to reflect the 
increasing cost of commercial items due to inflation. 
3. Effect of Acquisition Trends on Workload 
Vernon Edwards (2001) mentioned in his report Award-Term: The Newest 
Incentive that “government service contracts are becoming more complex as government 
agencies outsource more of their internal functions” (p. 1). Edward’s opinion mirrors that 
of Gansler in his 2007 report Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting. 
In order to explain this phenomenon, we examine the growing use of the best value 
method of procurement over the lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) method of 
procurement.  
A factor contributing to contract complexity and the increase of workload to the 
KO is use of the best value procurement method over the LPTA method. Best value 
procurement weighs the product quality using factors revealed in the statement of work. 
A best value procurement allows the KO to select a source even if it is not the lowest 
cost. If a Ford Ranger has a cheaper purchase price than a Dodge Dakota but requires 
more maintenance, the Dodge Dakota may be the better choice because its total life-cycle 
cost would be lower. This tradeoff decision illustrates the basic idea behind best value 
source selection. The FAR (2011) 15.101 defines best value procurement as follows: 
An agency can obtain best value in negotiated acquisitions by using any 
one or a combination of source selection approaches. In different types of 
acquisitions, the relative importance of cost or price may vary. For 
example, in acquisitions where the requirement is clearly definable and the 
risk of unsuccessful contract performance is minimal, cost or price may 
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play a dominant role in source selection. The less definitive the 
requirement, the more development work required, or the greater the 
performance risk, the more technical or past performance considerations 
may play a dominant role in source selection. 
Judging the merit of a product is accomplished through the use of an advisory 
board. The administration involved in assembling the board and recording board 
considerations and decision trails requires much time and expense. The failure of the 
board to properly and justifiably select the best value in accordance with a published 
strategy may result in a protest. A protest will directly involve the KO as he or she is the 
one who must explain the source selection process to the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO). Because there are more choices and considerations and subjectivity when 
using the best value procurement method, the KO’s workload increases when using this 
method.  
Lowest price technically acceptable source selection is the procurement method 
that accepts the lowest bid for contract award. As the title suggests, qualifying proposals 
will need to meet the technical aspects of the requirement to be considered for award. The 
FAR (2011) 15.101-2 defines LPTA as follows: 
The lowest price technically acceptable source selection process is 
appropriate when best value is expected to result from selection of the 
technically acceptable proposal with the lowest evaluated price. 
Identifying the lowest cost is an objective determination that takes less time than 
making a tradeoff decision. It’s obvious shortcoming is popularly characterized as one of 
Murphy’s Laws of Combat and quoted here from the Military-info.com website: “Always 
remember that your weapon was made by the lowest bidder.” The truth is that this is no 
longer the case for a growing portion of government contracts. The tradeoff of using 
fewer LPTA contracts is a lengthy best value determination and KOs spending additional 
time on source selection. 
The GAO (2010) reported that the “DoD chose a best value process for 
approximately 95% of its new, competitively awarded contracts on which it had obligated 
$25 million or more in fiscal year 2009” (p. 2). This fact is evidence of an increasing 
workload for KOs irrespective of the number or dollar value of contracts being awarded. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the use of best value procurement over other procurement methods. 
The added complexity of best value source selection would indicate an increasing 
contract load for KOs given a constant rate of contract awards.  
 
Figure 2.   Use of Best Value Procurement (From: Government Accountability Office 
[GAO], 2010, p. 11) 
Procurement methods and contract types have developed to support changes in 
the nature of warfare and advances in technology. This shift has increased the complexity 
of contracts. The increase of complexity must be captured and quantified in terms of 
person-hours to ensure that the contract processes are being carried out both efficiently 
and qualitatively. 
B. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
In this section, we examine previous research conducted on the contracting 
workload. The contracting workload has increased significantly since 1999. Both the 
number of contracts and complexity of contracts are responsible for this increase. The 
Acquisition Advisory Panel (AAP) report of 2007 highlighted this fact in its findings, as 






















The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have required significant contracting actions in 
both service and delivery orders. Despite this increase, the contracting workforce has 
remained relatively unchanged (Reed, 2010). The conclusion is that the contracting 
workforce had the excess capacity to absorb the additional workload, productivity of 
contracting personnel has increased, or some workload functions have been omitted. If 
workload functions are being omitted, we would expect to see symptoms, such as lack of 
oversight, in existing contracts.  
Researchers have conducted several studies with the hope of quantifying the 
correct size of the contracting workforce. The problem rests with the inability to measure 
the workload (Reed, 2011). Because the management requirements for contracts differ by 
many variables, an easy metric cannot be used to ensure the correct number of 
contracting personnel is assigned to efficiently manage a given workload. Examples of 
variables used in model prototypes and considered to be correlated to workload are 
contract type, solicitation procedure, and specific delivery verses indefinite delivery and 
quantity (Reed, 2010, p. 40).  
Finding 2-1
The dollar volume of federal government procurement has 
increased dramatically since 9/11/2001. Procurement 
obligations have increased 60 percent in the last five years.
Finding 2-2
In the last twelve years the qualitative nature of the 
procurement activity has also changed, placing markedly 
greater demands on the Acquisition Workforce for 
capability, training, time, and sophistication.
Finding 2-2-1
There has been a pronounced shift from acquisition of goods 
to acquisition of services. Service contracting places 
additional demands on the acquisition workforce, both in the
requirements definition and contract formation process, 
particularly in the realm of PBA,
but also on the contract management side . 
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Despite the difficulty in quantifying the correct number of required contracting 
personnel, the Defense Business Board (2010) stated that the “DoD will grow its Defense 
Acquisition Workforce by 20K” (p. 27). Based on the nebulous metric used to calculate 
the required 20,000-person growth figure, Timothy Reed (2010) wrote a report titled 
Army Contracting Command Workforce Model Analysis. In this report, Reed (2010) 
questioned how the DoD came up with the requirement for an additional 20,000 in 
workforce personnel given that no standard model is in place to estimate workforce 
requirements. The DoD does not have direct visibility of the contracting demands placed 
on the three services. As Reed (2010) pointed out in his report, there is no central 
repository of contracting workforce data that can be used to make an accurate 
determination of workforce manning requirements. Reed’s finding was that the Army, 
Air Force, and Navy each have their own way of calculating or estimating the numbers of 
contracting workforce personnel (Reed, 2010).  
C. WORKFORCE MODELS 
The purpose of this section is to identify the value of workforce models and 
describe models used by the Air Force, Army, and industry.  
The goal of an acquisition workforce model is to forecast the contracting person-
hours that are expected to be spent over a future period of time. The more predictive of 
future workload a model is, the more useful it will be to the user (Purkiss, 1981). Because 
it takes more than a year to receive the training and experience requirements of the most 
basic Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act certification level, DAWIA level 
1, reactionary hiring is not an option to fill gaps in the acquisition workforce. Table 3 





Table 3. DAWIA Contracting Career Field Certification Requirements           
(From: DAU, 2011) 
 
1. Air Force Manning Model 
The Air Force Manning Standard is applied to initial contract actions anticipated 
by a given office. The system works for determining whether existing manpower can 
handle a given workload or for determining how many contracting personnel are needed 
 
Core Certification Standards (required for DAWIA certification)  
Contracting Certification Level 1 
 Acquisition Training  None required 
 Functional Training  
  CON 090  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Fundamentals (R) 
  Personnel serving in a Contracting Coded position on 30 Sep 2010 are exempt from CON 
090 through 30 Sep 2012. 
  CON 100  Shaping Smart Business Arrangements 
  CON 115  Contracting Fundamentals 
  CON 170  Fundamentals of Cost and Price Analysis (R) 
  CLC 033  Contract Format and Structure for DoD e-Business Environment 
  CLC 058  Introduction to Contract Pricing 
 Education  
  At least 24 semester hours in accounting, law, business, finance, contracts, purchasing, 
economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, or organization and 
management 
  Baccalaureate degree (Any Field of Study) 
 Experience  1 year of contracting experience.  
 
Core Certification Standards (required for DAWIA certification)  
Contracting Certification Level 2 
 Acquisition Training   ACQ 101  Fundamentals of Systems Acquisition Management 
 Functional Training  
  CON 200  Business Decisions for Contracting 
  CON 216  Legal Considerations in Contracting 
  CON 270  Intermediate Cost and Price Analysis (R) 
  CON 280  Source Selection and Acquisition of Service Contracts (R) 
  CON 290  Contract Administration and Negotiation Techniques in a Supply Environment (R) 
  CLC 051  Managing Government Property in the Possession of Contractors 
  CLC 056  Analyzing Contract Costs 
  CLC 057  Performance Based Payments and Value of Cash Flow 
  HBS 428  Negotiating 
 Education  
  At least 24 semester hours in accounting, law, business, finance, contracts, purchasing, 
economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, or organization and 
management 
  Baccalaureate degree (Any Field of Study) 
 Experience  2 years of contracting experience.  
 
Core Certification Standards (required for DAWIA certification)  
Contracting Certification Level 3 
 Acquisition Training   ACQ 201A  Intermediate Systems Acquisition, Part A 
 Functional Training  
  CON 360  Contracting for Decision Makers (R) 
  1 additional course from the Harvard Business Management Modules 
  Additional requirement will be to select one of the below courses: 
  ACQ 265  Mission-Focused Services Acquisition (R) 
  ACQ 370  Acquisition Law (R) 
  CON 232  Overhead Management of Defense Contracts (R) 
  CON 235  Advanced Contract Pricing (R) 
  CON 244  Construction Contracting (R) 
  CON 250  Fundamentals of Cost Accounting Standards—Part I (R) 
  CON 334  Advanced Contingency Contracting Officer's Course (R) 
 Education  
  At least 24 semester hours in accounting, law, business, finance, contracts, purchasing, 
economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, or organization and 
management 
  Baccalaureate degree (Any Field of Study) 
 Experience  4 years of contracting experience 
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to fill a contingency workload. What it does not do is reach out to the commands that are 
generating the requirement for contracts in an effort to anticipate future contract needs 
nor account for high variability in the effort required by workforce personnel to complete 
contract actions.  
The Air Force model uses three variables for operational contracts that it has 
determined to be positively correlated with person-hours needed to complete contract 
process actions. These values were determined by using regression analysis against 
process action times (T. Sriver, personal communication, March 10, 2012). The process 
actions determined for inclusion into the analysis recognized over 150 individual types of 
activity in the procurement process and at least 50 types of activity in the contingency 
contracting environment (Air Force Manpower and Innovation Agency [AFMIA], 2001). 
There is a constant value of 1057 in the regression formula that represents the minimum 
hours required to operate an office regardless of workload size (T. Sriver, personal 
communication, March 10, 2012). Examples of significant contract work items not 
considered in the Air Force model are modifications to contracts, processing orders off of 
centralized contracts, and awarding or processing utility contracts (Reed, 2012a, p. 19). 
The Air Force determined that contract actions exceeding the SAP threshold 
account for the majority of the KO’s consumed hours. This evaluation is not surprising, 
given that the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (1994) eliminated aspects of 
competition for contracts under the current threshold of $150,000. The administration 
required to handle contract competition increases the scope of the contracting processes.  
Colonel Brian Norman was the Commanding Officer of the Air Force Manpower 
Agency in January of 2012. He stated that “the Air Force is currently in the process of 
revamping its acquisition workforce model” (B. Norman, personal communication, 
January 20, 2012). The office in charge of the changes is the Air Force Manpower 
Agency: 5MRS. David Zalinsky (personal communication, January 23, 2012) stated that 
the reasons for the change are due to changes in the contracting world since the original 
model was released in 1998. This change has been placed on hold due to funding issues 
according to Major Kelley Poree, USAF (personal communication, April 9, 2012). 
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a. Air Force Model Shortcomings 
Reed (2010) cited the Air Force Manpower Standard (AFMS) as “one of 
the most thorough manpower standards produced” (p. 43). Yet, for the accolades Reed 
gave it in his report, shortcomings remain. The AFMS does not use real-time demand 
signals from its customers when developing the total amount of workload. The workload 
estimations are created using historical data or contract requests that the office 
anticipates. Also, the inputs to the model are rather limited and do not encompass all of 
the factors that impact workload. The model also does not consider the quality of the 
output.  
b. Air Force Model Data Collection Method 
For the workforce models to accurately predict required person-hours, the 
workload must be correctly quantified. To quantify the workload, data collection of some 
sort is required. The Air Force uses the term per accomplishment time (PAT) to describe 
its method of data collection (AFMIA, 2001, p. 5). The Air Force created a database of 
historical PAT measures called the base contracting automated system and the standard 
procurement system (AFMIA, 2001, p. 5).  
The basis of the Air Force data collection method is the same as in the 
other services: query KOs in the performance of their job, and measure the time 
expended to get through the various contract processes. Because these processes are 
human driven and have many different forms of output, the times may not be uniform 
across all KOs.  
The Air Force Spiral 1 Model Report details the new model that is 
underdevelopment and now on hold due to funding issues. This report stated the human 
factor of contract work completion times as a principal problem in work-hour estimates 
for acquisition programs: “A typical study would focus on only production-orientated 
work, or work with a well-defined output. For Acquisition and Sustainment Units, much 
work does not lend itself to outputs. It is managerial, knowledge-based, or driven by 
oversight and reporting requirements” (ASU, 2011, p. 2).  
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As previously stated, regression analysis was applied to PATs for 
development of the formula used in the 2001 model. The final assignment of PATs for 
contracting actions used in the regression analysis of the formula was created in a 
workshop conducted by experienced Air Force contracting officers (T. Sriver, personal 
communication, March 10, 2012). An example of the data collection worksheet used in 
the workshop is located in Appendix D of this report. 
2. Army Manning Model 
The Army Contracting Command (ACC) is a recently established Army 
Command that has been established to pool all of the subordinate contracting elements of 
the Army Material Command into one unifying organization. The Army’s previous 
organization operated de-centrally in which each subordinate command would operate 
under its own internal workload model developed by its respective command. In 2009, 
Jeffery Parsons, then executive director of the ACC, commissioned Dr. Timothy Reed to 
research potential options for a constant measurement of contracting workloads. Reed 
stated that “the ACC has the unique opportunity to establish a standard workforce model 
for the recently amalgamated procurement offices now in the ACC” (Reed, 2010). 
Currently, the ACC does not function under a standard workforce model. In fact, 
it does not base its manning off of workload assessments at all. The driving force of the 
Army’s manning comes from its tables of organization and equipment (TOE) and tables 
of distribution and allowance (TDA). These documents provide the building blocks or 
structural guidelines from which a unit is built. The documents contain the units’ 
organization, equipment, and staffing. Rather than conduct workload analysis based off 
of manpower assessments, the Army “estimates” its staffing based off of the task 
organization (Reed, 2010). 
Since the establishment of the ACC, the Army has been analyzing some of the 
various models used by its organizations in order to see if there was a “best fit” solution. 
Though no model has been chosen as the standard workforce model, each possessed 
some useful measure that has promise for the future. The models analyzed included the 
following: 
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• Forces Command/Training and Doctrine Model, 
• Army Contracting Agency Southern Region (ACASR) Model, 
• Air Force Manpower Standard for Operational Contracting—Model was  
  fully discussed in the previous section, and 
• Army Material Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA) Model. 
Perhaps the two most promising models utilized were the ACASR and AMSAA 
models, respectively. The ACASR model utilized six variables consisting of the 
contracting action type, the solicitation procedure used, specified delivery, contract type, 
extent of competition, and dollars obligated. The variable complexity may have provided 
some promising results. However, the model usage was very limited and was not run 
enough times to form any solid conclusions (Reed, 2010). Similarly, the AMSAA model 
implemented the variables of contract actions, solicitation, ratio competitive to non-
competitive action, and the number of acquisition systems managed. Reed’s assessment 
of the model suggests that while it does provide actionable information and acknowledge 
the varying complexities of work, it does not allow for the projection of future workloads. 
As the model does give some promising results, its last complete run was in 2006 (Reed, 
2012a). 
3. Industry Manpower Models 
Industry manpower models focus on either the demand or supply side of 
manpower requirements. The demand side refers to the amount of work that a company 
has available and the number of people required to complete the work. The supply side 
refers to the number of qualified people in the workforce available to fill positions 
(Purkiss, 1981). Demand side models are very specific to a particular industry or 
company because their inputs are not easily transferable. For instance, a demand side 
model that is used by McDonalds to assemble hamburgers would not be applicable to the 
assembly line of a Ford plant manufacturing Ranger pick-up trucks. The processes are 
totally different. The similarities are that both require stock (people), both have a flow 
(promotions, new hires), and both have a degree of wastage (people leaving). Most 
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literature on demand side manpower models will refer to the personnel movement in 
those broad-based terms: stock, flow, wastage. Like McDonalds and Ford, there are many 
differences between industry and DoD workforce. The use of manpower models in 
industry has evolved over a longer period of time than those of the DoD. An analysis of 
civilian industry models may reveal pros and cons of managing with models that can be 
applied to prospective manning models for DoD contracting. One thing that remains 
constant and lends itself to some comparison is that demand side manpower modeling is 
possible in both civilian industry and the DoD. 
Manpower models are typically classified as either descriptive or normative. The 
paragraphs that follow provide a brief overview of descriptive and normative models and 
describe the pros and cons for each. 
a. Types of Models in Industry 
Manpower models in industry typically fall into two categories: 
exploratory and normative (Purkiss, 1981). Each model type utilizes a stock and flow. 
The stock refers to the workers, and the flow refers to the movement of the workers in 
and out of various positions of employment.  
Exploratory models are used by managers to conduct what-if scenarios. 
An exploratory model “can give the manager an insight into the way his manpower 
system works and how it would respond to different stimuli” (J. S. Edwards, 1983). This 
type of model is also referred to as a descriptive model because its function is to imitate 
the behavior of the company (Purkiss, 1981). A manager would use an exploratory model 
to provide insight on how many hires would be needed given an increase in retirements 
or wastage.  
A model that utilizes mathematics and regression to optimize manning is 
referred to as a normative model. A normative model “can compute an optimal set of 
personnel decisions (on recruitment, promotion, training, etc.) against goals stated in 
some form of objective function. These are often tailor-made to represent particular 
manpower systems” (J. S. Edwards, 1983). These models are also referred to as 
prescriptive models because their output is based on process input from planners. The 
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prescriptive properties of normative models have historically been a point of aversion for 
managers (J. S. Edwards, 1983). It is unlikely that a manager of any kind desires to have 
his or her decision-making ability taken from them. The output of a normative model can 
be interpreted that way if the results are not presented properly. J. S. Edwards (1983) 
asserted words of caution when introducing a manpower model to managers in this quote: 
“It should again be realized that while this [use of a model] may be second nature to an 
O.R. worker, it may represent a new departure for a manpower planner; indeed some 
personnel managers appear to be actively suspicious of models” (J. S. Edwards, 1983). 
The Air Force and Army manning standards are normative models. They 
utilize regression analysis of various work processes to decide on an optimal number of 
employees.  
b. Industry Definition of a Good Model 
John S. Edwards cited four properties of a good model in his report titled 
A Survey of Manpower Planning Models and Their Application. These four properties are 
described in the following paragraphs and are referenced in Chapter VI of this report. 
The first property of a good model is that “it should as far as possible use 
terms and concepts with which the manpower planner is already familiar. … these must 
be explained in the planners own terms” (J. S. Edwards, 1983, p. 1032). The emphasis 
made by Edwards is that the model should be seen by the manager as an aid to his or her 
decision-making process and not an alternative. “Selling the model [to the manager] is 
most important” (J. S. Edwards, 1983). By reducing the unfamiliar language in a model, 
the manager will be more comfortable using the data. 
The second property of a good model is that the model’s output should be 
“clear and concise, so that the amount of further interpretation required is at a minimum” 
(J. S. Edwards, 1983). This property is similar to the first in its focus on keeping the 
model user-friendly for the manager. It is also out of respect for the manager’s time to 
have the model output be easy to understand. Output that requires extensive analysis to 
understand will likely be disregarded. 
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The third property of a good model is that its output should be expressed 
in non-mathematical terms. The logic behind this property is so that underlying 
assumptions made in the model are expressed in descriptive language. This gives 
managers an opportunity to question the model and engage the output into the overall 
decision-making process. 
The fourth property is the hardest of all to achieve in manpower models: 
“the data required by the model should be available on a practicable time-scale and to a 
reasonable degree of accuracy” (J. S. Edwards, 1983). Edwards stated that the first stage 
in setting up a manpower model is establishing a database. Although this property was 
developed by J. S. Edwards in 1983, it has absolute relevance for contracting manpower 
models in present day. Ensuring that the data is on a “practicable timescale” was a 
primary concern of Elliot Branch (2012) in our phone interview. His concern over using a 
model to estimate contracting workload is that at best the data “will tell us how many 
people we needed last year” (Branch, 2012). That concern appears to be in line with 
Edwards’ fourth property of a good model. 
This report started with a discussion of the contracting workload. We 
attempted to examine the work that takes up a KO’s time. Measuring that work 
effectively is cited by J. S. Edwards as being critical for developing a manpower model. 
c. Industry Performance Metrics 
In this portion of the report, we discuss the use of performance metrics by 
civilian industry. Although this report is primarily focused on the use of models, we 
comment on performance metrics used by NAVSUP in Chapter V and draw from 
industry lessons for that commentary. The inputs of a manpower model are often made 
with the intent of improving company performance. A company’s desired performance is 
typically captured in a metric of some type. It is important to know how a company 
evaluates itself in order to understand the logic behind the inputs of their manpower 
model. For example, if a company is a manufacturer of Ford Ranger pick-up trucks, a 
performance metric will likely include the process time of installing the engine and 
transmission with a penalty imposed for rework. The optimal amount of employees 
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needed for installing the engine and transmission with the fewest penalties for rework 
will be the employee demand input for the manpower model. A performance metric used 
to capture the optimal amount of manufacturing employees will be useful to the planner 
who designs the manpower model. That person would draw from the performance metric 
the total personnel that would need to be on station at any given time in order to produce 
the desired level of product quality. A brief overview of industry performance metrics is 
discussed in this section of the report and attention is given to problems that can arise 
from managing through metrics. 
Andrew Likierman (2009) wrote an article for the Harvard Business 
Review that is particularly useful for identifying problems that can be encountered by 
managing through metrics. The article is titled The Five Traps of Performance 
Measurement. Likierman identified what he considers to be “traps” of performance 
measurement. 
The first trap that Likierman (2009) identified is “measuring against 
yourself.” The implication is that any performance measurement should be based on a 
comparison from outside of the originating business (i.e., the competition). While it may 
seem like an achievement for a business to increase its return on investment (ROI) by 5% 
in a year, that increase becomes a liability if the competition has increased its ROI by 
25% in the same time.  
The concept of comparing internal numbers to those of competitors or 
peers has been used in government. Public schools use standardized test scores to rank 
themselves against other school districts. This has been accepted by many people as a 
valuable tool in deciding which school is best for their kids. The idea that the 
performance of DoD contracting offices could be measured against other DoD 
contracting offices, even intra-service, may be a valuable measure. The benefits cited by 
Likierman for measuring against the competition are to help “define competitive 
priorities” (p. 1) and the ability to “reward senior executives for doing better than 
everybody else” (Likierman, 2009, p. 1). 
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The second trap described by Likierman (2009) is “Looking Backward.” It 
is important for a metric to be indicative of current performance rather than past 
performance. Likierman advised managers to “Look for measures that lead rather than 
lag the profits in your business” (p. 2). The example given in the article is a hospital that 
uses preemptive treatment of patients as a measure of cost control. If preemptive 
treatment can be positively correlated to the high cost of treating late term illness, then 
the measure is a leading indicator of cost control (Likierman, 2009). 
The third trap is putting too much faith in numbers. “Numbers driven 
managers often end up producing reams of low-quality data.” (Likierman, 2009) The 
examples given in the article depict the loose use of return on investment. It is easy to 
pick high-performing areas of a company and ignore low-performing areas in order to 
produce numbers that show return on investment success. However, the numbers may 
lead managers away from the real story, which is that certain work centers may be 
successful but the company is losing money overall (Likierman, 2009). Asking the 
question “what measure is the right one?” (Likierman, 2009) is more important than 
assuming any measurement is better than no measurement, for a manager who wishes to 
avoid the third trap of performance measurement. 
The fourth trap is gaming metrics. “The moment you choose to manage by 
a metric, you invite managers to manipulate it” (Likierman, 2009, p. 3). The draw of 
managing by a metric, according to Likierman’s fourth trap, is creation of a decision 
making surrogate. Allowing a conclusion to be drawn from apparently mathematical 
evidence creates the illusion of credibility. It can also provide a disengagement from 
personal responsibility for weak managers looking to prove their worth to a company. A 
way to avoid falling into the fourth trap is to never use metrics as the final authority for 
decision making. They should be used as a guide only with ultimate decision authority 
coming from a person rather than a number. 
The fifth trap described by Likierman is “Sticking to your Numbers too 
Long.” An organization “Manages what they Measure” (Likierman, 2009). The risk in 
identifying metrics is that managers will intensely focus on the measured areas and give 
less attention to other areas of their operation. Managers that want to look good in a 
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company will make sacrifices to keep measured areas of their operation in goal. The way 
to avoid too much focus on numerical metrics is to diversify the metrics and emphasize 
that numbers do not make managerial decisions. 
Models and metrics used by industry are thought to be good when they 
play a side role to the managers. There was not a single piece of literature in our review 
whose authors concluded that a model should be used prescriptively in a workplace. 
Likierman stated his opinion of the role metrics should play in this quote: 
A really good assessment system must bring finance and line managers 
into some kind of meaningful dialogue that allows the company to benefit 
from both the relative independence of the former and the expertise of the 
latter. (Likierman, 2009) 
Our take-away from this examination of industry models and metrics is 
that a model should be used to indicate a rough order of magnitude to managers making 
manning decisions. A metric should be used to indicate potential problem areas to a 
manager assessing performance. The final decision is always in the hands of a human. 
Problems occur when applying too much emphasis on a model or metric, such as using a 
model to prescribe decisions. A good model or metric is one that plays a support-only 
role to a manager’s decision making. 
D. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Timothy Reed’s 2010 research report titled Army Contracting Command 
Workforce Model Analysis stated that  
The Navy is not pursuing a Service-wide standard for operational 
contracting workload, but rather is allowing System Commands to develop 
a standard if they find it to be of use. A lack of a standard model could 
result in disruptions to contracting workloads for system commands 
(SYSCOMs) utilizing a substandard model or no model. (p 48) 
In Chapter III, we examine the manpower estimation tools currently in use at 






A. NAVY SYSCOM’S CHOSEN FOR ANALYSIS 
There are a total of five Navy system commands (SYSCOMs): Naval Sea, Naval 
Supply, Naval Air, Naval Facility, and Space and Naval Warfare. We chose to analyze 
NAVSEA and NAVSUP due to the availability of data from these two systems 
commands. An area of further research would be to analyze the contract manning models 
and workload assessment tools of the other three Navy SYSCOMs.  
1. Naval Sea Systems Command 
NAVSEA is the Navy’s oldest and largest SYSCOM. The NAVSEA official 
website links its history back to the origin of the United States Navy in this quote: “The 
origin of NAVSEA dates to 1794, when Commodore John Barry was charged to oversee 
the construction of a 44-gun frigate and ensure that all business ‘harmonized and 
conformed’ to the public’s interest” (Naval Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA], 2012). 
NAVSEA is responsible for buying the Navy’s ships and weapon systems. It operates on 
a budget of about $30 billion and accounts for a quarter of the Navy’s spending. A large 
portion of NAVSEA’s acquisitions are for Acquisition Category 2 or higher items. 
Acquisition categories (ACATs) are established to determine spending authority for 
various levels of acquisition programs. Acquisition Category 2 programs are those with 
research and development costs greater than or equal to $140 million, or procurement 
costs greater than or equal to $660 million in FY09 dollars (“Acquisition Category 
[ACAT],” 2009).  
Because contracts for ship building and major weapon systems are highly 
complex, NAVSEA uses a milestone process to estimate the contracting workload for 
new procurement or modifications of large contracts (Branch, 2012). The KO negotiates 
milestone dates with the program manager to determine a timeline. The estimates that the 
KO uses are based on experience. The system is strong because it is decentralized in 
nature. It accommodates the individual complexity of the contracts by instituting 
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maximum participation of the KO. A standardized workload estimation tool falls short of 
being able to account for all the complexities of a contract, as opposed to an actual KO 
conducting a tailored review. The shortcoming is in the time-consuming and tedious 
nature of individually reviewing each contract and breaking down the expected workload. 
Table 4 depicts an example of the milestone process worksheet that the KO uses to track 
the contracting workload and account to the customer (program manager). 




The Milestone process used by NAVSEA is applied to individual actions that 
have too many complexities to be captured in a manpower model. The discriminator that 
NAVSEA uses to determine when a contract will require a milestone plan is the SAP 
threshold (S. J. Rustemier, personal communication, March 12, 2012). For those 
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contracts not requiring a milestone plan, NAVSEA uses an electronic collection base 
called the electronic procurement request: “The ePR refers to an electronic document 
generated in SPS to communicate program contractual requirements electronically to the 
KO. An ePR may result in a solicitation, contract, contract modification, or order issued 
by SEA 02 for Supplies or Services” (NAVSEA, 2007b, p. 7).  
The ePR uses PALT codes to assign a time estimate for various contract actions. 
PALT stands for procurement action lead time. Like the Air Force model, the PALT 
codes use completion time estimates derived from historical data. Also similar to the Air 
Force model is the method of catagorization: the PALT codes basket contracts by those 
that are beneath the SAP threshold and those that exceed it. The PALT codes identify 
Firm Fixed Price and competed contracts as variables that are indicators of workload. The 
purpose of using PALT codes at NAVSEA is to provide an estimation of contract 
completion time for managers to use in milestone tracking. The estimations also allow a 
timeline to be provided to customers in operational environments. Figure 3 shows a chart 
detailing various PALT codes and associated completion goals. 
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Figure 3.    NAVSEA PALT Codes (From: NAVSEA, 2007a, p. 10) 
In 2011, NAVSEA completed 7,000 contract actions valued at $27 billion (J. G. 
Lofgren, personal communication, January 11, 2012). Just 400 of the total contract 
actions completed required milestone plans. Because of their complex nature, the 
milestone plan contracts do not lend themselves to a fixed manning model. Lofgren 
pointed out in an email that a substantial workload for NAVSEA occurs in the contract 
administration phase of the contract processes.  
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Specifically, he mentioned incremental funding, extending period of performance, award-
fee modifications, and options exercised as activities that make up a significant portion of 
the KO’s workload. Notably, all of these actions occur post award.  
2. Naval Supply Systems Command 
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Global Logistics Support (GLS) is 
headquartered in San Diego, CA. The idea behind creating NAVSUP GLS was to 
implement “structural, functional, and customer alignment initiatives” (NAVSUP, 2012). 
NAVSUP GLS was assigned responsibility for seven fleet logistic centers (FLCs) located 
in San Diego, CA; Norfolk, VA; Jacksonville, FL; Puget Sound, WA; Pearl Harbor, HI; 
Sigonella, Italy and Yokosuka, Japan. NAVSUP GLS is ideally suited for analysis in this 
report because a key component of their mission is to “broker workload” (NAVSUP, 
2012) between the seven FLCs. Because workload management is a key element of its 
command’s mission, its workload management techniques are more mature and readily 
identifiable than a SYSCOM that is not actively brokering workload between subordinate 
commands.  
NAVSUP uses performance-based metrics to determine whether contracting 
workloads are being handled properly. The specific performance areas used in their 
metric are as follows:  
• Large contract milestones: Seeks to measure the progress of large contract 
completion against an internally developed milestone plan; 
• Simplified acquisition cycle time: Measures the timeliness of SAP awards 
against a 30-day objective; 
• Customer satisfaction: Measures the rating by customers in terms of 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory; 
• Close-outs: Measures all contracts pending award, both large and small, 
against internally developed milestones; 
• Competition: Measures the % of contracts that are competitively awarded; 
• Staffing: Measures the total of full-time equivalents onboard against the 
budgeted number allowed; and 
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• Small business: Measures % of small business awards against an internally 
proposed goal. 
The metrics NAVSUP uses seek to identify variables in the contracting process 
that are thought to correlate closely with successful contract outcomes. NAVSUP baskets 
contracts in terms of size. The discriminator for size is the simplified acquisition 
threshold of $150,000. Because there are many more contract processes at work to 
produce a contract above the SAP level, using the SAP threshold as a discriminator is 
logical and likely predictive of workload. A key point here is that NAVSUP does not use 
the performance metric as an indicator of workload. The metrics are used primarily to 
measure year-over-year performance for the individual FLCs and are reported monthly to 
the contracting directors and deputies (S. M. Pierce, personal communication, January 24, 
2012). 
Interestingly, the FLCs use customer satisfaction as a measure of contract success. 
This is a step toward developing a qualitative measurement for contracts. Both Elliot 
Branch (2012) and Tim Reed (2012) mentioned, during phone conferences, the distinct 
lack of a qualitative measurement for contracts. They both indicated that any measure of 
contract workload would be incomplete without a tool to measure the product quality. 
NAVSUP has initiated a system of measuring contract quality by providing its FLC 
commanders with customer satisfaction feedback, as shown in Figure 4. 
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Activity:  NAVSUP GLS Date: 12/1/2011
Data Source:  NAVSUP Customer Satisfaction Website
Metric:
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sept Year to Date
Jacksonville
# of Surveys Received 52 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 106
# Rated Satisfactory or Above 51 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 105
Goal 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0%
Percentage 98.1% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 99.1%
Norfolk
# of Surveys Received 39 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57
# Rated Satisfactory or Above 39 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57
Goal 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0%
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Pearl Harbor
# of Surveys Received 27 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48
# Rated Satisfactory or Above 27 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48
Goal 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0%
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Puget Sound
# of Surveys Received 29 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63
# Rated Satisfactory or Above 29 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63
Goal 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0%
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
San Diego
# of Surveys Received 7 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
# Rated Satisfactory or Above 7 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
Goal 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0%
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Sigonella
# of Surveys Received 15 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
# Rated Satisfactory or Above 15 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
Goal 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0%
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Yokosuka
# of Surveys Received 8 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
# Rated Satisfactory or Above 8 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
Goal 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0%
Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
TOTAL NAVSUP GLS
# of Surveys Received 177 155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 332
# Rated Satisfactory or Above 176 155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 331
Goal 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0%
Percentage 99.4% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 99.7%
95% or more surveys received have an overall rating of satisfactory or above
90-94% of surveys received have an overall rating of satisfactory or above




The heads of contracting at the seven FLCs are responsible for maintaining all of 
the “dashboard” metrics. NAVSUP GLS headquarters personnel consolidate, analyze, 
and combine the various performance metrics into an annual staffing report that is 
presented to the FLC contracting directors and deputies (S. M. Pierce, personal 
communication, January 24, 2012). 
The data is not used for the purpose of determining contracting workload 
shortfalls. Since the data is similar to the data used by the Air Force Manpower Standard, 
it is easy to mistake as a tool used for managing contracting workload. For instance, if the 
FLC is below goal in large contract processing but is fully staffed with FTE personnel, it 
could be presumed by a user of the reports that the workload is improperly balanced and 
should be shifted to another FLC. However, because the reports are not specifically 
drawn for that purpose, they could lend themselves to bias according to Likierman’s 
fourth trap of performance metrics. The contracting directors of the FLCs are likely 
conscious of their professional reputation. Because the reports are a reflection of their 
organization’s performance, they will work hard to ensure that the goals are met. In short, 
the managers will not let their organizations fail in order to show that they need more 
people. Their effort to keep the FLC within goal may nebulize the excess or shortage of 
workload in their command.  
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IV. METHODOLOGY OF ANALYSIS 
We discovered that NAVSUP does not use a model to prescribe manning. The 
question remains, could a model be used to aid in manpower decisions at NAVSUP? To 
answer this question, we applied contract action data from NAVSUP to the Air Force 
Manpower Standard and determined if a manning output from the model could be used. 
We utilized J. S. Edwards’ four properties of a good model, statistical analysis, and our 
opinion to determine if the results are meaningful. 
We were unable to secure primary data from NAVSEA in the form of a contract 
log from its headquarters (HQ) and satellite contracting offices. Although we obtained 
the approximate contract actions for their HQ activity from fiscal year (FY) 2011, 
together with dollar value via email, we chose to exclude it from this analysis because we 
could not positively verify that the reported contract actions represent initial actions.   
Although it is unlikely for an acquisition manning model to be accepted as being 
100% accurate in capturing the required staffing for handling a given contracting 
workload, the Air Force Manning Standard is generally regarded as the gold standard. 
The Air Force Manpower Standard is cited by Reed as “One of the most thorough 
manpower standards produced” (Reed, 2010).  
A. THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER STANDARD 
In this portion of our report, we normalized the data from NAVSUP and applied it 
to the Air Force Manning Standard described in AFMS 12A0. We explain differences 
and insight through analysis of the AFMS output and the actual manning at NAVSUP.  
The AFMS requires three standard inputs to produce a workload estimate. 
Specifically, the input are as follows: 
Y2 = X5 (0.0000520) + X6 (0.3736) + X7 (9.7848) + 1057         
where Y is total person-hours and the X variables are defined by the AFMIA 
(2001) as follows: 
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X5 = Centralized Contracting Dollars excluding modifications, adjusted to 
the Base FY (1998) for Inflation. 
X6 = Centralized Contract Actions Less Than or Equal to $100,000, 
excluding modifications, Decentralized Blanket Purchase Agreement calls, 
and summarized reporting (use latest complete FY - Oct through Sep).  
X7 = Centralized Contract Actions Greater Than $100,000, excluding 
modifications, Decentralized Blanket Purchase Agreement calls, and 
summarized reporting (use latest complete FY - Oct through Sep). 
(AFMIA, 2001) 
The $100,000 value as an indicator of contract workload was chosen because it 
represents the SAP threshold in 1998. Contracts awarded under SAP take less time to 
produce for reasons described in Chapter II of this report. Because the SAP threshold has 
since increased from $100,000 to $150,000, we use $150,000 for distinguishing between 
contract actions added to the X6 and X7 variables.  
1. Inflation Adjustment 
Because the data used was drawn from 2011 reports of NAVSUP, the first step in 
using the AFMS formula was an adjustment to account for inflation that has occurred 
between 1998 and 2011. Paragraph 3.2.1 of the AFMS 12A0 cites use of the SAF/FM 
Inflation Conversion Program for the purpose of converting current dollars to 1998 
dollars. The SAF/FM no longer maintains the calculator mentioned in the AFMS 12A0 
therefore a joint calculator was used. The calculator is provided by the Navy Center for 




Figure 5.   Joint Inflation Calculator (From: Naval Center for Cost Analysis [NCCA], 
2012) 
The inflation between 1998 and 2011 was 152% so we divided 2011 year dollar 
values by 1.52 to get our 1998 dollar value for X5 in the AFMS formula. 
2. Person-Hour Assumption 
The AFMS defines a person-hour as  
A unit of measuring work. It is equivalent to one person working at a 
normal pace for 60 minutes, two people working at a normal pace for 30 
minutes, or a similar combination of people working at a normal pace for a 
period of time equal to 60 minutes. (AFMIA, 2001, p. 17) 
To solve for Y, we used the Air Force Instruction 38-201, Management of 
Manpower Requirements and Authorizations. Referencing attachment 3 of the 
instruction, we assumed a normal, civilian 40-hour work week and subtracted holidays, 
sick days, and leave time. The total work hours of an FTE per month and the denominator 
of our Y calculation was 143.3.  
3. Enter Base/Input Year(1985 - 2060) 1998
A.  Select Inflation Type from List   
B.  Enter Output/Target Year    2011




Years 1998           2011
Escalation Type FY/Constant$           FY/Constant$
1.0                                 1.5185 1.52
1.0                                 1.5185 1.52
1.0                                 1.5185 1.52
1.0                                 1.5185 1.52
1.0                                 1.5185 1.52
1.0                                 1.5185 1.52
Quick Look
Defense Wide Procurement
Enter starting values in the blue input 
cells.  The inflation factor (based on your 
selected appropriation, year, and type) is 
applied and the results given in the output 
column
               Optional - For Quick Look, complete steps A, B & C below
Generate Inflation Table Go To SAR Calculator Worksheet
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3. Manpower Table Assumption 
It is important to note that the AFMS provided for a result that is intended to be 
applied to their specific manpower table, which is attachment 3 of the AFMS 12A0. 
Table 5 of this report shows the first page of the manning table from attachment 3 of the 
AFMS 12A0. The job descriptions and Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 

























Table 5. AFMS 12A0 Manning Table (From: AFMIA, 2001, p. 33) 
 
Note that the row marked Total refers to the total output of the formula in terms of 
required manpower. The formula output will vary based on the hours in a work day and 
the number of work days per week. The assumption used in this report is detailed in the 
section titled Person-Hour Assumption. Also important to note is that the qualification 
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level of personnel are factors that are to be interpreted by the user of this formula when 
applying outside of Air Force operational contracting environments. Because we applied 
this formula to a Navy organization with civilian personnel, equivalencies were made in 
section B to the column marked Grade. Additionally, paragraph 2 of the AFMS 12A0 
cites additional personal requirements above the requirement for KOs. These additional 
personnel include a Commander, Information Management and Purchase Card personnel. 
The application of these additional personnel requirements to the AFMS output for each 
FLC can be viewed in Appendix C. 
B. EQUIVALENCY ASSUMPTIONS 
Because we applied the Air Force model results to a Navy organization, it is 
important to describe the qualifications for both the Air Force contracting personnel and 
the Navy contracting personnel. We assumed that pay grade was less relevant than 
acquisition qualification level. If significant differences are detected in the level of 
qualification, it may nullify the output of the model. 
1. Air Force Contracting Qualifications 
The Air Force uses the APDP to measure the qualification of their contracting 
personnel. The acronym stands for Acquisition Professional Development Program. The 
levels of progression are I through III with III being the highest. The qualification 
requirements for the APDP intentionally mirror those of the Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). The following citation is from the U.S. Air 
Force (USAF; 2008) Acquisition Managers Career Field Education and Training Plan 
and shows the link between APDP and DAWIA qualification: 
DAWIA is implemented in the Air Force through the Acquisition 
Professional Development Program (APDP). The APDP certification 
process reflects the education, training, and duty experience gained by the 
acquisition manager through a formal program. (p. 22) 
The qualification requirements for the APDP exceed those of the DAWIA 
qualifications on which they are based. For instance, the APDP level 1 educational 
requirements are a mirror of the DAWIA level II requirements, and the APDP level II 
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requirements are a mirror of the DAWIA level III. The APDP level III incorporates 
program management courses and systems engineering courses, which are outside of the 
requirements of DAWIA level III certification. Figure 6 is the progression chart for 
APDP levels from the Air Force Career Field and Education Guide. 
 












Table 6. Air Force Specialty Code Descriptions (After: USAF, 2008) 
 
 
Figure 7 shows a career progression pyramid of the enlisted Air Force ranks and 
their associated APDP contracting level. By comparing the lowest stated rank on Table 5 
to the qualification level shown in Figure 7, it was determined that all personnel cited on 
the manning Table 5 would be at least DAWIA level I certified. 
Specialty Code Specialty Summary APDP Qualification
AFSC 64P3
Plans, organizes, manages, and accomplishes contracting 
functions to provide supplies and services essential to Air Force 
daily operations and war-fighting mission. Included are 
accomplishing contracting system processes, formulating 
contracting policy and procedures, coordinating contracting 
activities, and directing contracting operations. The contracting 
system includes effective acquisition planning, solicitation, cost or 
price analysis, evaluating offers, source selection, contract award, 
and contract administration. Level I or higher
AFSC 6C0X1
Level I
AFSC 6031 Level I
AFSC 6051 Level I
AFSC 6071 Level II or higher
AFSC 6091 Level II or higher
Source: http://usmilitary.about.com/od/airforceenlistedjobs/a/afjob6c0x1_2.htm
Manages, performs, and administers contracting functions for 
commodities, services, and con struction using simplified 
acquisition procedures, negotiation and other approved methods. 
Uses automated contracting sys tems to prepare, process, and 
analyze transactions and products. Acts as business advisor, 
buyer, negotiator, administrator, and contracting officer. Supports 
all functions of contingency operations
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Figure 7.   USAF Contracting Enlisted Career Path Pyramid  




2. Navy Contracting Qualifications 
The Navy contracting specialty codes are 1102 for civilian and 1306 for military 
officers. There is no designation for enlisted contract specialists. A Navy contracting 
command may have enlisted personnel assigned but they would not play an active role in 
the contract process. Rather, they would be assigned to a personnel function such as a 
yeoman or personnel man.   
The job description of a Navy 1102 is as follows: 
Contract Specialist (1102 job series) positions are involved in the 
acquisition of supplies and services. Assignments may include 
requirements determination and contract planning, business evaluation and 
price-cost analysis, negotiation, contract administration, and contract 
termination. (DON, 2012) 
Navy 1306 KOs receive training and qualification via Navy contracting 
internships and also the Naval Postgraduate School. They are generally regarded in the 
contracting community as being highly effective in their roles as KOs. A Navy 1306 is 
expected to work seamlessly between contingency environments and major program roles 
such as those at NAVSEA.  
DAWIA qualification requirements from Table 3 of this report are incorporated 
into the training of both Navy 1102 and 1306 KOs. 
3. Determination of Equivalency 
Because the Air Force APDP levels are based on the DAWIA (1990) and 
incorporate all of the same requirements for DAWIA certification, albeit at an accelerated 
rate, we have concluded that the output of the Air Force model will yield an apple-to-
apples comparison to the manning requirements of a Navy contracting command. In other 
words, if the Air Force would take over a Navy contracting command, they could use 
personnel with Air Force specialty codes 64PX and 60XX and assume that those 
personnel will have at least the equivalent training as the Navy personnel who would 
otherwise be working the contracts. 
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4. Extraction of Initial Contract Actions  
The AFMS requires that initial contract actions and obligations be used in the 
formula. It was necessary to obtain the contract log from NAVSUP in order to extract all 
the initial contract actions from NAVSUP’s FY2011 data. The contract log of NAVSUP 
was placed on a file share website with permission given for a one-time download by 
LCDR Mellgren. The total contract actions for NAVSUP in FY2011 total 63,675 line 
items. This value includes contract actions from contracts awarded in previous fiscal 
years, contract modifications and exercised options. 
The following steps detail the actions taken to extract the initial contract actions 
from NAVSUP’s FY2011 contract log: 
• Separated the contract actions from the master log into seven categories 
representing the seven individual FLCs by conducting a sort of the column 
titled “Subcommand3”. Once contract actions from the FLCs were 
isolated, they were placed onto separate spreadsheets. 
• Filtered for contract actions with a modification number of zero to arrive 
at the list of initial contract actions for FY2011 by conducting a sort of the 
column titled “Modification Number” and applying a COUNTIF formula 
in the bottom cell to arrive at the total number of transactions with zero 
modifications. This total gave us the total initial contract actions for the 
FLC. 
• Identified the contracts that were equal to or less than the SAP threshold 
of $150,000. This action was completed by applying a COUNTIF formula 
to the bottom row of the column titled “Action Obligation” and counting 
actions with zero modifications and a value equal to or less than $150,000. 
• Identified those contracts that were greater than the SAP threshold of 
$150,000. This action was completed by applying a COUNTIF formula to 
the bottom row of the column titled “Action Obligation” and counting 
actions with zero modifications and a value greater than $150,000. 
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Screen shots of the original contract log and the sort process are in Appendix B of 
this report. Table 7 shows the initial contract actions and obligations that were extracted 
from NAVSUP’s FY2011 contract log. 
Table 7. NAVSUP Initial Contract Actions  
FLC Initial Contract 
Actions <$150k 
Initial Contract 





COMFLC 35167 1799 36966 $2,537,926,572.89 
Jacksonville 4830 205 5035 $942,542,605.53 
Norfolk 7775 941 8716 $898,001,429.57 
Pearl 2582 82 2664 $87,029,959.25 
Puget  8541 127 8668 $136,264,026.98 
San Diego 3906 186 4092 $217,519,446.61 
Sigonella 2413 96 2509 $87,561,311.85 




Table 8 and Figure 8 illustrate the results from running the Air Force model using 
the contract action data from NAVSUP. We included NAVSUP’s actual onboard totals 
for comparison to the Air Force Manpower Standard output. The onboard totals were 
drawn from their FY2011 staffing brief slide and are shown in Appendix A of this report. 
Screenshots of the actual AFMS formula being applied in Microsoft Excel format are in 
Appendix C of this report. 
Table 8. NAVSUP GLS Manning Compared to AFMS Output 
 
Figure 8 represents the output of the model in graphical form. 
 
Figure 8.   NAVSUP Manning Vs. AFMS Output 
Fleet Logistic Center Actual Manning AFMS Output Over/Under Percent Manning
COMFLC 743 968 -225 77%
Jacksonville 84 271 -187 31%
Norfolk 269 320 -51 84%
Pearl Harbor 56 51 5 110%
Puget Sound 52 83 -31 63%
San Diego 92 94 -2 98%
Sigonella 76 54 22 141%























A. RELEVANCY OF AFMS MODEL 
1. Adequacy of NAVSUP’s Current Manning  
NAVSUP GLS is a mature contracting organization, having been in existence for 
more than 10 years. Each FLC has a head of contracting to ensure that the staffing levels 
are sufficient to produce a high quality product. Further, they use a qualitative measure 
for their contract products in the form of a customer satisfaction survey, and all FLCs are 
within the desired level of customer satisfaction as of FY2011 (See Figure 4). We used 
NAVSUP’s contract log from FY2011 and can conclude that the contract actions shown 
in that log were completed to a satisfactory level based on the customer satisfaction 
surveys. The indication is that the manning levels at NAVSUP are proven suitable for 
performing their given contracting work load. 
2. AFMS Correlation to Current NAVSUP Manning 
To determine the relevancy of the AFMS to NAVSUP’s manning needs, we 
started with the assumption that the current manning of the FLCs are at a sufficient level. 
We applied a coefficient of correlation for the AFMS results to the actual manning of 
NAVSUP FLCs. Statistically, the results of a coefficient of correlation range from -1 to 
1. The result of 1 would indicate total positive correlation or that the exact number of 
FTEs recommended in the AFMS was present at the FLC. The result of -1 would indicate 
total negative correlation or that for every FTE recommended in the AFMS, the FTE was 
absent from the FLC number (not possible in this case). The actual coefficient of 
correlation for the AFMS output and 2011 manning at NAVSUP GLS was 0.753865, 
which indicates a strong positive correlation.  
 
Figure 9.   AFMS output to NAVSUP 2011 manning coefficient of correlation 
We conclude that the AFMS is relevant for use at NAVSUP GLS. 
 
-1
   
Strong Negative Correlation Strong Positive Correlation 
AFMS to NAVSUP Correlation = 0.753865 
1 0 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
We started this project by asking a simple question: what model or standard is the 
Navy SYSCOMs using to manage their acquisition workload? That is, how do they know 
when they need more people? 
We found that Navy SYSCOMs do not use a model that can forecast KO manning 
requirements. However, a system is being used at both NAVSEA and NAVSUP by 
senior management to determine when more people are needed. That system is a 
historical manning chart that is updated as needed by senior management. Because the 
answer to our question was simple, we focused this project on answering a secondary 
question: could a model be used to forecast contract workload at Navy SYSCOMs?  
To answer this question, we applied the most credible model in use, the Air 
Force’s Manpower Standard, to NAVSUP’s FY2011 contract action data. The AFMS is 
cited by Timothy Reed in his 2012 report as “Favored by many non-Air Force Dod 
Agencies” (p. 19). The results of applying the AFMS to NAVSUP’s contract action data 
yielded manning requirements that were surprisingly close to the existing manning 
showing a general shortage across all FLCs within the continental U.S. and over manning 
for those FLCs overseas.  
The proximity to existing manning numbers indicates that the model may have 
relevancy to application in Navy SYSCOMs. Modification of the formula to account for 
present complexities in contracts could yield even more useful output. In the conclusions 
portion of this report, we criticize the AFMS output for NAVSUP GLS in terms of 
properties that civilian industry have determined as good. We then focus on the 
conclusions we were able to draw from the output of the AFMS using NAVSUP’s 
contract action data. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Pros and Cons of Using the AFMS  
 The literature review of this report detailed four properties of a good model as 
described by John Edwards (1983) in his report titled A Survey of Manpower Planning 
Models and Their Application. The application of the Air Force Manpower Standard to 
NAVSUP’s data has pros and cons that can be weighed using Edwards’ four properties 
with additional reference to Likierman’s (2009) Five Traps of Performance 
Measurement. 
a. The Pros  
The AFMS output is in terms that the managers of NAVSUP would 
already understand. As demonstrated in Chapter IV, the qualification requirements of the 
Air Force personnel mirror those of the full-time equivalent contracting staff at an FLC. 
The output of the model would be manning numbers that directly correlate to the FLC. 
This makes the model strong in accordance with J. S. Edwards’ (1983) first property of a 
good model.  
The output of the AFMS model does not require further analysis 
refinement. The output clearly states the number of FTEs required for a given contracting 
workload. This makes the model strong in J. S. Edwards’ (1983) second property of a 
good model.  
The math required for using this model can be accomplished by use of an 
Excel spreadsheet, as shown in Appendix C of this report. The output is whole numbers. 
The non-mathematical nature of interpreting the output makes the model strong in the 
third property of a good model (J. S. Edwards, 1983). 
The AFMS model was not created at NAVSUP. It utilizes per 
accomplishment times from Air Force contracts. This gives the models’ output an 
unbiased credibility. Because the measurements of per accomplishment time were drawn 
from an outside agency, the model is strong in terms of Likierman’s (2009) fourth pitfall, 
as described in Chapter II of this report. 
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An additional pro of using the AFMS model is that the data required for 
input is readily available. Formatting an existing contract log to extract initial contract 
actions requires minimal administrative burden as opposed to model that requires 
collection of unique primary data. 
b. The Cons 
The drawback of using the AFMS is that it does not capture real time 
contract action times in its estimates of manpower. The estimates were drawn from 1998. 
Since then, contracting has become more complex (Ganlser, 2007). The model does not 
consider differences between Air Force and Navy contracting. A contracting office with a 
higher % use of IDIQ orders or commercial items will need less people than a contracting 
office procuring complex products and services requiring negotiation. This drawback will 
likely be inherent in any contract workforce model created and used between DoD 
MAJCOMs. Because there are innumerate variables that will ultimately affect the 
completion time of a contract, no model can be looked at as zero defect.  
There will always have to be a human decision-maker interpreting the 
results of the model and tailoring the manning decision based on the needs of the 
command. The model will never take the place of human decision-makers in manning 
decisions.   
2. What the Model Output Says About NAVSUP 
Outliers on the negative side, such as FLC Jacksonville, could be examined to 
determine how they have managed with just 31% of the manning prescribed by the 
AFMS. It may be found that they have efficient processes that can be incorporated into 
the other FLCs. Another potential factor for FLC Jacksonville is that they have a less 
complex workload—they may be buying more commercial products, or awarding more 
contracts off of established IDIQs.   
We performed a basic spend analysis on FLC Jacksonville and found that they are 
unique in a couple ways. 75% of their contract dollars go to one vendor: HP Enterprise 
Services, LLC. It may have been possible for FLC Jacksonville to generate contract 
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actions and spend contract dollars in 2011 with less manpower requirements relative to 
the other FLCs given such a large % of contract actions go to a single vendor. 
Additionally, FLC Jacksonville use a source under the 8(a) Business 
Development (BD) Program, Alaskan Native American Corporation, for nearly 1700 
total contract actions in 2011. This shows that a large amount of their workload for 2011 
may have required less manpower than a FLC completing contracting actions through 
several sources. 
Outliers on the positive side, such as FLC Sigonella with 140% of the manning 
prescribed by the AFMS, can be examined for redundant processes or perhaps more 
complex contract actions relative to the other FLCs. Another consideration is that the 
foreign economy presents longer contract processing times due to language barriers. Any 
of these may warrants the additional manpower at FLC Sigonella; only the FLC 
management could make a final determination. 
The speculation on outliers represents questions that could be asked when 
reviewing the output of the AFMS. The conclusion that we have drawn here is that use of 
the model would provide managers with a valuable outside opinion of manning norms. 
We show that the model could be used at NAVSUP and speculate that it could also be 
used at other DoD major commands (MAJCOMs). 
3. Why the Model Wasn’t Applied to NAVSEA HQ 
The contracting work at NAVSEA represents system procurement. System 
procurement is highly complex and is significantly different from the intended 
application of the Air Force Operational Contracting Model. The Air Force model was 
designed for use in an “Operational Contracting Environment” (AFMIA, 2001). 
NAVSEA contracting completed just 400 large contract actions in FY2011 (J.G. Lofgren, 
personal communication, January 11, 2012). However, NAVSEA in terms of dollars is 
the largest procurement activity in the federal government. The contract obligation from 
NAVSEA’s headquarters is more than $27 billion dollars per year (Branch, 2012). The 
explanation for this is that NAVSEA procures the ACAT 1 weapon systems for the Navy. 
The workload estimates built into the Air Force model did not use contract process times 
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derived from such large, complex procurement actions. The Air Force has recognized that 
system procurement is different and has a different model for that application. 
A. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Incorporating the complexities of modern contracts is critical to the success of any 
contract workload model. All KOs and management officials who we spoke to in the 
course of this project agreed that contracts today are more complex than in 1998. In the 
background and literature review of this report, we attempted to identify workload 
variables that may be positively correlated to a KO’s workload. Capturing and 
quantifying variables that are 100% correlated to contracting workload is the holy grail of 
contracting workforce manning models.  
1. How a 1998 Model May Still Be Relevant 
Timothy Reed (2010) stated that there are concerns regarding the age of the 
AFMS and that the output may no longer be relevant to modern contracts that are thought 
to be more complex. This statement contrasts with our finding that the model is still 
relevant. Our explanation for this is the increased use of information technology (IT) in 
contract processing. 
The additional complexity of contracts since 1998 has been offset by efficiencies 
and productivity enhancements of modern IT. Table 9 depicts the history of IT 
improvements in supply chain management. 
Table 9. Electronic Supply Chain Management Evolution (From: Handfield, 
Monczka, Giunipero, & Patterson, 2011) 
 
Solution Time Period Focus Primary Use of System
MRP-DRP 1970S Internal/managing inventory Inventory planning, inventory control, and distribution efficiencies
EDI 1980s External Electronic transmission of purchase of purchase order
ERP 1990s Internal Integration of all business functions for processing and reporting
SRM and CRM 2000s External Managing and controlling the interface between buyers, suppliers, 
and customers
Collaboration 2000s External-internal CPFR systems permit constant communication within the supply chain 
via RFID and point of sale systems
Advanced Sourcing 
Analytics & Social 
Networking
2010 and beyond External-internal Sourcing analytics and computerized negotiations; Social Networks 
help build relationships
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An example of an IT solution that provides remarkable efficiency to the 
contracting workload is the website FedBizOpps.com. Since 2001, it has been designated 
as the single source for federal government procurement opportunities that exceed 
$25,000. It has streamlined the posting of contract solicitations and modifications (GSA, 
2001). FedBizOpps allows KOs to electronically post solicitations and modifications. 
Before the use of FedBizOpps, KOs had to manually post solicitations in the Commerce 
Business Daily (CBD) (Stanberry, 2008). 
A Request for Proposal (RFP) is a document created by the KO that invites bids 
from prospective contract sellers. The RFP is used by contract sellers to create a proposal. 
It contains a detailed account of the government’s requirement. Before FedBizOpps, any 
modification to the RFP required reposting in the CBD and also notification to companies 
who had already provided a proposal (Stanberry, 2008). This process was especially 
cumbersome for developmental contracts with many specifications. If a single 
specification was changed by an engineer working on the project, the modification would 
need to be posted in the CBD. The modification would be attached to the original hard 
copy RFP using different colors of paper as a color coding system. RFPs with many 
modifications were referred to as rainbow RFPs (R. Rendon, personal communication, 
April 6, 2012). The ability to post RFPs and modifications in real time on a website 
reduces the time required for processing contract actions. 
Additional examples of IT solutions that have provided efficiency to the 
contracting workload are the widespread use of email and spreadsheets. As shown in 
Figure 7, outside IT communication was in its infancy in 1998. In FY2011, IT 
communication was a standard in every DoD office, with Excel spreadsheets and 
PowerPoint being staples of information exchange. We assert that these IT efficiencies 
have created efficiencies for contract action processes. These efficiencies may be 
counteracting the increasing complexities of contracts and may be an explanation as to 
how a formula from 1998 may still provide relevant output. 
 59 
2. Recommendations for Use of the Model 
The implications of accurately forecasting contract manning requirements through 
the use of a model could be reduction of oversight issues. Although the ultimate 
significance of proper manning is just an assertion at this point, having the appropriate 
number of KOs to provide contract oversight in the contract administration and contract 
closeout process areas will certainly be better than having too few.  
The proximity of the AFMS output to the actual manning of NAVSUP implies 
that the model can be used with relative confidence for commands outside of the Air 
Force. The AFMS could be a partial solution to the oversight problems mentioned in the 
Gansler (2007) report, the Acquisition Advisory Panel (2007) report, and Warlord, Inc 
(Tierney, 2010). If it is true that the oversight issues are the result of too few contract 
specialists, the model could be used as a tool for operational commanders in the Army to 
flag contracting commands that may be at risk of manning shortages.  
We recommend that the model’s output be included in any Service’s discussion 
about contracting manpower concerns to act as a baseline reference point for decision-
makers. Since the contracting workload is managerial and knowledge based (ASU, 2011), 
it would be extremely difficult to calculate manning levels so precisely that each KO 
would be guaranteed to work 143.3 person-hours a month (reference the person-hour 
assumption in Chapter IV) on their contract workload and every contract would be 
completed on time with the appropriate qualitative output. We can say with confidence 
that if the model were applied to a projected workload, the output would reflect the 
approximate manpower that the Air Force and a mature Navy SYSCOM would use to 
handle the given workload. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
There are many different areas of research that need to be covered in order to 
fully explore the use of contract workforce models in DoD MAJCOMs. Our research 
project uncovered several ideas that were outside the scope of our project but warrant 
further study. Rather than discard these ideas we listed them in bullet format below. 
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• In his report titled Managing Contracts in Turbulent Times, Rendon (2008) 
describes a model called the Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) ©. 
Rendon and Garrett seek to assess an “Organization’s contract management 
process ability” (Rendon & Garrett, 2008). The assessed organization is graded 
using five levels of proficiency with one being the lowest and five being the 
highest. An interesting study would be to apply the CMMM© to organizations 
that assess their contracting workforce requirements using a model, and compare 
against an organization that does not use a model, and determine the correlation 
between contract management maturity and the organization’s use of workforce 
planning. A lack of workforce planning may be a precursor to broader 
management issues within the organization.  
• Developing a qualitative measure for contracts is an important element of any 
workload measurement system. Both Branch (2012) and Reed (2012b) have 
indicated a need for this measure in order to ensure the success of any type of 
workload model. The Fleet Logistic Centers of NAVSUP GLS all distribute and 
collect customer satisfaction surveys. It may be possible to collect the surveys 
from the most satisfied customers and the least satisfied customers and then 
analyze the associated contracts. It may be possible to develop a qualitative metric 
for contracts based on the surveys and associated metrics.  
• Utilize NAVSUP or another SYSCOM completion time estimates and correlate 
contract process time to the writing background and experience level of KOs in 
the command. See if there is a positive correlation between experience level and 
contract completion time. A problem in doing this will be to control for the fact 
that the most experienced KOs will likely be given the most challenging 
contracts; thus, it will look like it takes them longer. 
• Evaluate the per accomplishment time of various civilian 1102 employees of 
varying general schedule pay grades and see whether a learning curve exists and 
whether it can be quantified and predicted. The assumption going in would be that 
a GS7 is less experienced and would require more time than a GS12 to process a 
given contract action. Capturing the learning curve of the more experienced GS 
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employee may allow for a variable to be introduced in a manpower formula to 
account for learning curve. The value of this variable could change based on the 
experience levels of the KOs present in the office. 
• Obtain contract logs from an organization such as the Joint Contingency 
Acquisition Support Office. Normalize the data in accordance with Chapter IV of 
this report. Run the AFMS using the joint contingency contract data. Validate the 
output of the model using the opinion of decision-makers in the command and J. 
S. Edwards’ (1983) five properties of a good model. 
We have shown in this project that the Air Force Operational Contracting 
Manpower Standard could be used to estimate manning requirements at the Navy’s 
Supply Systems Command. Additional research on workforce models for DoD 
contracting is a step toward ensuring future manning is adequate across all DoD 
contracting MAJCOMs. We hypothesize that adequate KO manning is necessary for 
proper contract oversight and may be the ultimate solution to oversight issues addressed 
by the AAP (2007) and Gansler (2007). 
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COMFISCS 770 772 769 761 760 763 760 759 770 758 747 743
Jacksonville 80 80 81 82 82 80 80 83 83 83 83 84
Norfolk 276 278 281 269 268 276 276 274 281 278 271 269
Pearl Harbor 73 74 73 72 68 67 67 67 69 67 60 56
Puget Sound 63 54 53 52 53 53 52 53 52 49 52 52
San Diego 92 95 93 93 96 96 96 95 95 95 93 92
Sigonella 82 84 83 82 82 81 81 79 79 75 75 76
Yokosuka 93 93 92 95 96 95 94 94 96 96 98 99
LCE 11 14 13 15 15 15 14 14 15 15 15 15
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
CONTRACTING – FY2011
TOTAL STAFFING BY FLC 




Data obtained from monthly staffing reports.  Includes ALL staffing (454 GS, 25 military, 2 Asscociates,117 interns, 123 FSN/MLC/FNIH, and 22 contractors)
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APPENDIX C  
 
Figure 13.   AFMS Formula Output for COMFLCS 
 
 
Figure 14.   AFMS Formula Output for FLC Jacksonville 
X5 X6 X7









%  Manning 77%
Additional Positions IAW 12A0 part 2
Commander 8
Purchase Card (Table 3) 16
Electronic Business (Table 3) 41
Director of Business Operations and Superintendant 16
Information Management Personnel (Table 1) 15
Plans and Programs (Para 2.3.4) N/A
A-76 N/A
Fixed Variance N/A













Adjusted to 1998 dollars 
by dividing by 1.52
see AFI38-201 
Attachment 3
7399 is due to the 
formula constant 1057 x 
7 individual offices
X5 X6 X7









%  Manning 31%
Additional Positions IAW 12A0 part 2
Commander 1
Purchase Card (Table 3) 2
Electronic Business (Table 3) 5
Director of Business Operations and Superintendant 2
Information Management Personnel (Table 1) 2
Plans and Programs (Para 2.3.4) N/A
A-76 N/A
Fixed Variance N/A
Total additional personnel 12
FY2011 FLC JACKSONVILLE WORKLOAD










Figure 15.   AFMS Formula Output for FLC Norfolk 
 
 
Figure 16.   AFMS Formula Output for FLC Pearl Harbor 
X5 X6 X7









%  Manning 84%
Additional Positions IAW 12A0 part 2
Commander 1
Purchase Card (Table 3) 2
Electronic Business (Table 3) 6
Director of Business Operations and Superintendant 2
Information Management Personnel (Table 1) 3
Plans and Programs (Para 2.3.4) N/A
A-76 N/A
Fixed Variance N/A
Total additional personnel 14
FY2011 FLC NORFOLK WORKLOAD


















%  Manning 110%
Additional Positions IAW 12A0 part 2
Commander 1
Purchase Card (Table 3) 2
Electronic Business (Table 3) 5
Director of Business Operations and Superintendant 2
Information Management Personnel (Table 1) 2
Plans and Programs (Para 2.3.4) N/A
A-76 N/A
Fixed Variance N/A
Total additional personnel 12
FY2011 FLC Pearl Harbor WORKLOAD










Figure 17.   AFMS Formula Output for FLC Puget Sound 
 
 
Figure 18.   AFMS Formula Output for FLC San Diego 
X5 X6 X7









%  Manning 63%
Additional Positions IAW 12A0 part 2
Commander 1
Purchase Card (Table 3) 2
Electronic Business (Table 3) 5
Director of Business Operations and Superintendant 2
Information Management Personnel (Table 1) 2
Plans and Programs (Para 2.3.4) N/A
A-76 N/A
Fixed Variance N/A
Total additional personnel 12
FY2011 FLC PUGET SOUND WORKLOAD


















%  Manning 98%
Additional Positions IAW 12A0 part 2
Commander 1
Purchase Card (Table 3) 2
Electronic Business (Table 3) 5
Director of Business Operations and Superintendant 2
Information Management Personnel (Table 1) 2
Plans and Programs (Para 2.3.4) N/A
A-76 N/A
Fixed Variance N/A
Total additional personnel 12
FY2011 FLC SAN DIEGO WORKLOAD










Figure 19.   AFMS Output for FLC Sigonella 
 
 
Figure 20.   AFMS Output for FLC Yokosuka 
 
X5 X6 X7









%  Manning 140%
Additional Positions IAW 12A0 part 2
Commander 1
Purchase Card (Table 3) 2
Electronic Business (Table 3) 5
Director of Business Operations and Superintendant 2
Information Management Personnel (Table 1) 1
Plans and Programs (Para 2.3.4) N/A
A-76 N/A
Fixed Variance N/A
Total additional personnel 11
FY2011 FLC SIGONELLA WORKLOAD


















%  Manning 122%
Additional Positions IAW 12A0 part 2
Commander 1
Purchase Card (Table 3) 2
Electronic Business (Table 3) 5
Director of Business Operations and Superintendant 2
Information Management Personnel (Table 1) 2
Plans and Programs (Para 2.3.4) N/A
A-76 N/A
Fixed Variance N/A
Total additional personnel 12
FY2011 FLC YOKOSUKA WORKLOAD










The 1040 worksheet is designed as the main data collection tool for use in the 
field or in a workshop. Each study participant will fill out a separate 1040 sheet with data 









Figure 21.   Air Force 1040 Data Collection Form 
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